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Background and Research Questions
Prior research on IT risk identification and assessment has focused on the internal audit function. For example, Hermanson et al. (2000) found that internal auditors emphasized traditional IT risks and controls (e.g., safeguarding IT assets, processing applications, and ensuring data integrity, privacy and security). Alternatively, systems development and acquisition risks received the least attention from internal auditors. The authors found that several factors were associated with internal auditors' IT oversight, including "the nature of the audit objective, the prevalence of computer audit specialists on the internal audit staff, and the existence of new computerized systems" (39).
IT risk management research at the board level is scarce and limited in scope to a focus on information security risks. The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 2001a) surveyed corporate directors and board advisors to assess companies' reliance on IT and companies' experiences with information security breaches. The results revealed that many boards address information security, but that there was "room for improvement" (NACD 2001a, 3) . The participants indicated that approximately half of the companies delegated responsibility for information security oversight to the audit committee. While these findings contribute to our understanding of board and audit committee oversight in this area, information security represents only one of several IT risks. The role of the board and its committees with respect to other IT risks remains unexplored.
As a subcommittee of the board of directors, the audit committee typically is charged with the risk oversight function of the corporation (NACD 2000) . Specifically with regard to IT risks, the POB Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000, 67) recommends that audit committees "promote candid discussions…on significant information system risks, including those related to any specific regulations or issues."
Although considerable research exists on audit committees (see DeZoort et al. (2002) for a synthesis of the literature) and the scope of audit committee oversight (e.g., Wolnizer 1995; DeZoort 1997), no study addresses the audit committee's role in monitoring IT risks. This study provides an initial examination of audit committee oversight in the area using the COBIT framework to organize the research.
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT 2000) is a comprehensive framework for addressing IT risks that is widely accepted in practice. First released in 1996 by the Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation, COBIT combines existing comprehensive business control models (e.g., COSO) with specialized IT control models (http://www.isaca.org). The COBIT framework includes 34 high-level control objectives and 318 detailed objectives developed through extensive research. COBIT is becoming internationally recognized as the authoritative source on IT governance, IT control objectives, and IT audit used in a variety of applications by private industry, public accounting firms, governments and academia (Lainhart 2000).
Research Questions
We address five research questions in this initial study of audit committee oversight of IT risk. First, we assess whether audit committees appear to provide any oversight in the IT domain. Second, we assess where audit committees focus their attention -for example, on "traditional" IT risks (e.g., monitoring) or on such areas as acquisition and implementation of IT.
Third, we evaluate whether audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise are related to perceptions of IT risk oversight within audit committees. Prior research on audit committees provides evidence that these three focal characteristics can affect audit committee activities and performance (e. Fourth, we explore the effect of the responding audit committee members' expertise on perceived oversight of IT risks. Prior audit committee research (e.g., DeZoort 1998; DeZoort and Salterio 2001) highlights the importance of experience and knowledge on member oversight and task performance.
Finally, we explore the effects of company size and industry on perceptions of audit committee oversight of IT risk. Prior research on internal controls (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Ivancevich et al. 1998 ) addresses the link between company size and focus on control, typically finding more extensive controls in larger companies. Researchers (e.g., Beasley et al. 2000; Carcello et al. 2002 ) also have explored industry effects on audit committee activity, finding relatively high levels of audit committee activity in industries such as financial services.
Stated formally, the research questions are:
1.
To what extent do audit committee members perceive their audit committee provides oversight of IT risks? 2.
Which specific IT risk areas receive the greatest attention from audit committees? 3.
Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary with the independence, diligence, and/or expertise of the audit committee members? 4.
Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary based on the expertise of the responding audit committee members? 5.
Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary based on company size and industry?
Method
Survey
We developed a survey using the 34 high-level control objectives specified in the COBIT model (see Appendix). Audit committee members were asked to provide information regarding the largest public company on whose audit committee they served. We did not retain information that would allow us to identify the individual participants or the companies reflected in their responses.
A majority of the survey questions pertained to the members' perceptions of their audit committee's involvement in the oversight of IT risk. While the questions were based on the assumption that the audit committee provides IT risk oversight, the participants were given the opportunity to state whether the audit committee was formally responsible for monitoring this domain. Several questions focused on management's, the internal auditor's, and the external auditor's commitment to managing IT risk. In addition, the participants were asked to self-assess their qualifications for overseeing IT risk. The survey concluded with a demographics section. 
Sample
The KPMG Audit Committee Institute mailed 1,000 surveys to directors and audit committee members on our behalf. A second mailing was sponsored by the Corporate Governance Center. 2 In an effort to maximize response rate, several procedures supported by Dillman (2000) were performed, including (a) offering a copy of the results to the participants, (b) using pre-stamped return envelopes and Likert scales to promote responses, and (c) having the study sponsored by (and cover letters included from) the KPMG Audit Committee Institute and the Corporate Governance Center.
We received 39 usable responses from audit committee members and had 50 sets of materials undeliverable. An exact response rate cannot be calculated because the ACI's confidential mailing list contained a mix of "non-audit committee member directors" (not of interest to us) and audit committee members (of interest to us). Based on additional information obtained from the ACI, it appears that audit committee members may comprise roughly 40% of the 1,000 person list. Accordingly, we estimate our response rate at approximately 10%. 3 While some audit committee studies in the accounting literature (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty 1993) have experienced response rates over 20%, we believe that the present study's response is reasonable given the length of the survey, the timing of the mailings (i.e., during 2002), and the likelihood of reduced interest because many audit committees apparently do not address IT risks in a specific manner. However, we do recognize the important potential limitation of the response and believe that the results should be interpreted with caution.
Model
The following ordinary least-squares regression model is used to address Research Questions 3-5:
ACITOV = f (INDEP, FREQM, ACITEX, YRSAUD, COBEXP, LOGSALES, FINSVCS).
 ACITOV (Audit committee IT oversight). The dependent variable is measured using the COBIT model. A scale of 1 (no oversight) to 7 (heavy oversight) is used to assess the audit committee's perceived role in overseeing each of the 34 control objectives. The variable ACITOV is calculated using the mean of the 34 control objectives (another method is explored later).  INDEP (Audit committee independence). This independent variable is measured as the percentage of members of the audit committee who are independent, outside directors (i.e., non-management, without other affiliations to the company).  FREQM (Frequency of audit committee meetings). This independent variable is a measure of board diligence and refers to the number of audit committee meetings held in the most recent year as specified in the questionnaire.  ACITEX (Audit committee IT expertise). This independent variable is a measure of the full audit committee's level of IT expertise. Participants rated fellow audit committee members' qualifications to oversee IT risks on a scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified, a perception-based measure.  YRSAUD (Years of audit experience). This independent variable measures the responding audit committee member's years of auditing experience.  COBEXP (Prior exposure to COBIT model). This independent variable measures the responding audit committee member's prior experience with the COBIT model on a scale from 1 = none to 7 = considerable.  LOGSALES (Natural log of sales). This independent variable refers to company size. It is measured as the natural log of sales, expressed in millions.  FINSVCS (Financial services). This independent variable refers to whether a company is classified within the financial services industry (1 = financial services, 0 otherwise). Table 1 presents demographics and descriptive statistics on the model variables. The responding audit committee members generally are older males with nine years of audit committee experience. On average, the participants currently served on 1.80 audit committees. 5 On average, audit committee oversight of IT risks appears quite limited (Research Question 1), as the mean of ACITOV was 2.38 on a scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight. Overall, it appears that audit committees provide limited oversight of IT risks.
Results
Demographics and Descriptive Statistics
The companies' audit committees were primarily independent, and the average committee met five times per year. The participants rated their fellow audit committee members' IT expertise as moderate (mean of 3.54 on a scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified). The participants had an average of 2.97 years of audit experience, and most did not have prior familiarity with the COBIT model. Finally, average revenues for the samples companies were $819 million (mean of LOGSALES was 6.14). Thirteen percent of the companies were in the financial services industry. Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the model's dependent and independent variables. Four correlations were greater than 0.50. Audit committee IT oversight is positively correlated with the respondents' prior familiarity with COBIT (0.67), the frequency of audit committee meetings (0.52), and audit committee IT expertise (0.52). In addition, companies with greater audit committee IT expertise had more frequent audit committee meetings (correlation of ACITEX and FREQM was 0.57). 
Correlation Matrix
IT Oversight of Specific Control Objectives
The Appendix presents the mean rating for each of the 34 control objectives, as well as group means for each of the four business processes (Research Question 2). Overall, it appears that audit committees place the greatest emphasis on the Monitoring area (overall mean of 3.12) and the least emphasis on Acquisition and Implementation (mean of 1.99). This concentration of effort appears consistent with the focus of internal auditors. Hermanson et al. (2000) found that internal auditors primarily addressed more traditional IT risks, while systems development and acquisition received the least attention. 
Regression Results
Table 3 presents the results of estimating the OLS regression model (Research Questions 3-5)
. The model has significant explanatory power (adjusted R 2 = 53%, F = 7.18, p = .00). Two of the independent variables of interest (YRSAUD and COBEXP) were significantly related to ACITOV. First, ACITOV is positively related to the participants' personal audit experience (YRSAUD, p = 0.02). Audit experience may sensitize audit committee members to the importance of risk assessment, particularly risks associated with computerized information systems. Such a focus on risks could influence the entire audit committee to focus greater attention on oversight of IT risks.
Second, the responding audit committee members' prior familiarity with COBIT (COBEXP, p = 0.00) was positively associated with ACITOV. This variable may reflect the participants' exposure to or knowledge of IT risk assessment, which may in turn influence the audit committee to focus greater attention on oversight of IT risks.
None of the other variables was significantly associated with ACITOV. As a result, prior linkages between internal control / audit committee oversight and such factors as audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise, company size, or industry do not appear to extend to the IT oversight domain. In this context, based on this one study, it appears that the responding audit committee members' expertise and experience are the primary factors associated with audit committee IT oversight.
Other Analyses
We performed four other analyses related to Table 3 . First, the participants indicated whether the audit committee was expressly charged with oversight of IT risks. A variable coded 1 = audit committee has formal responsibility for IT oversight, 0 otherwise, was added to the model. The results in Table 3 were unaffected, and the new variable was not significantly associated with IT oversight (p = 0.70) Second, we considered several other measures of the participants' expertise -self-assessed personal qualifications to oversee IT risks, years of IT experience, years of audit committee experience, years of accounting experience, and years of director experience. When added to the model, none was significantly related to ACITOV. The other results were fairly consistent with those presented in Table 3 ; however, in two cases the p-value on YRSAUD was greater than 0.05 (0.07 in one case and 0.15 in another). The 0.15 level occurred when years of accounting experience was added to the model. Third, before addressing the 34 COBIT objectives, the participants were asked: (1) "What role does your audit committee play in overseeing IT risk?," and (2) "What role should your AC play in overseeing IT risk?" We ran two additional models, replacing ACITOV with the response to each of these questions. In both instances, the overall regression model was insignificant (p > 0.05).
Finally, in the COBIT model, the 34 individual control objectives are divided into four business processes (see Appendix). As an additional analysis, we ran four regression models, each time replacing the dependent variable ACITOV (the mean of the 34 control objectives) with the mean rating within one of the business processes. For example, the first model run used the mean of the 11 items in Planning and Organization as the dependent variable. YRSAUD and COBEXP each were significantly associated with oversight in three of the four models (p < 0.06). Overall, it appears that the results within the four business processes are reasonably consistent with the overall results presented in Table 3 .
Discussion and Conclusions
This exploratory study examined the audit committee's role in overseeing IT risks. IT risks are a major component of risk management because an organization's information is among its most vital assets and is paramount to the organization's success (Horton et al. 2000) . Although considerable research exists on audit committees and on IT risk (including a recent NACD study investigating board oversight of information security), no study to date addresses audit committee oversight in this domain.
Based on responses from 39 audit committee members, we found (1) little audit committee emphasis on oversight of IT risks, (2) audit committees involved with IT oversight focus on more traditional risks (e.g., monitoring), while very little attention is devoted to IT acquisition and implementation, and (3) the amount of IT oversight is positively associated with the responding members' auditing experience and prior familiarity with the COBIT model for assessing IT risks. Audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise, company size, and industry were not significantly associated with IT oversight.
This study has three important limitations. First, this initial study is exploratory. Rigorous future research is needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn about the audit committee's ability and willingness to provide effective IT risk oversight. Second, the results of this study rely on the perceptions of the participants regarding one of their audit committees' oversight of IT risk. The participants' perceptions may not accurately reflect the audit committee's true level of IT oversight. Finally, the relatively small sample size and response limit the ability to generalize the extent of audit committee oversight of IT risks.
We encourage additional, large-sample investigations of the role of the audit committee in overseeing IT risks. In particular, future research may examine the degree to which audit committees accept responsibility for IT oversight, how such committees enhance their IT expertise, and what other factors may be associated with greater IT oversight by the audit committee.  ___________________
